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The study sheds light on the extent to which various stakeholder pressures influence
voluntary disclosure of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and how the impact is
explained and moderated chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics of 215 FTSE
350 listed U.K. companies for the year 2011. The study developed a classification of
GHG emission disclosure based on the guidelines of GHG Protocol, Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclo-
sure using content analysis. Evidence from the study suggests that some stakeholder
pressure (regulatory, creditor, supplier, customer, and board control) positively
impacts on GHG disclosure information by firms. We found that stakeholder pressure
in the form of regulatory, mimetic, and shareholders pressure positively influenced
the disclosure of GHG information. We also found that creditor pressure also had a
significant negative relationship with GHG disclosure. Although CEO age had a direct
negative effect on GHG voluntary disclosure, its moderation effect on stakeholder
pressure influence on GHG disclosure was only significant on regulatory pressure.
K E YWORD S
institutional theory, sustainable greenhouse gas policies, upper echelons theory and
stakeholders engagement, voluntary disclosure
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In light of the rising prominence of climate change and greenhouse
gas (GHG) emission issues on world agenda, corporate transparency
and accountability are viewed as key to ensuring that the global
warming trend is reversed. Consequently, the question of what leads
corporations to provide more climate and GHG emissions information
than others has emerged as a topic of considerable interest in both
scholarly and business literature (Department for Environment, Food
and Rural Affairs [DEFRA]). Prior empirical evidence has consistently
found that a diverse range of stakeholder groups may
pressure/influence a firm to widen its disclosure scope to include
social and environmental information (Chuang & Qianfei, 2013;
Cormier & Magnan, 2004; Kuo, Yeh, & Hui-Cheng, 2012; Sandoval,
2015). Indeed, there is growing evidence that corporations are now
positioning themselves to respond to various institutional pressures
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emanating from external stakeholder pressure (Liesen, Hoepner, Pat-
ten, & Figge, 2015) such as regulators (Kuo et al., 2012; Zhu & Sarkis,
2007), community/society (Braham, Butcher, Kurtz, Roudsari, & Vyas,
2016), customers, competitors (Darnall, Henriques, & Sadorsky, 2010),
and even shareholders (Reid & Toffel, 2009).
However, despite facing homogeneous institutional pressures,
questions remain as to why organisations' responses, as evidenced by
their disclosures, are heterogeneous (Doshi, Dowell, & Toffel, 2013).
Collectively observed in the literature, prior evidence depicts that
stakeholder pressures substantially influence the response and in this
case disclosure of GHG (see Liesen et al., 2015). Despite this, how-
ever, it remains the fact that the voluntary disclosure phenomenon is
still fraught with uncertainty and has both known unknowns and
unknown unknowns (Lewis, Walls, & Dowell, 2013). However, critical
knowledge voids remain within the realm of financial disclosure
research. Critical among these knowledge voids is the paucity of evi-
dence regarding the role of individual actors in voluntary climate
change disclosure decisions (Bamber, Jiang, & Wang, 2010). To date,
current literature has failed to shed light on the joint effects of chief
executive officer (CEO) characteristics, stakeholders' pressures, and
GHG disclosure.
A critical argument made by Carter, Kale, and Grimm (2000) is
that top managers are often guardians of a firm's image, and as such,
they are particularly careful on how information is disseminated to
stakeholders. As a result, managers' characteristics are likely to influ-
ence the pattern of disclosure of GHG (Haque & Ntim, 2018; Shahab
et al., 2019; Shahab, Ntim, Chengang, Farid, & Samuel, 2018). A priori,
the importance of investigating the role played by various managerial
characteristics needs no emphasis in the area of disclosure decisions
given that the allocation of scarce resources to manage stakeholder
pressure often involves complex decision making, which is primarily
based on managerial perception (Cooper, Raman, & Yin, 2018;
Tauringana & Chithambo, 2015). According to Huang and Kung
(2010), disclosure of environmental information is very much a prod-
uct of the manager–stakeholder relationship. Therefore, managers, in
turn, think about stakeholders based upon their perception, which in
itself is a product of many aspects, including ones experiences or ori-
entation (Mazutis, 2013; Shahab et al., 2019).
From a theoretical point of view, examining the cross-level nature
of the relationship between a CEO's characteristics such as age and
organisation voluntary reporting strategy enriches our understanding
of the role of managers' differences in organisation processes and out-
comes. Only a handful of studies (e.g., Elmagrhi, Ntim, Elamer, &
Zhang, 2019; Krishnamurti & Eswaran, 2018; Shahab et al., 2019)
have examined the role played by top executives' characteristics such
as age and tenure on organisational outcomes and strategies. Hence,
this study partly addresses that gap. From a practical standpoint, as
regulators grapple with viable policy options to enhance GHG emis-
sions accountability and firms are racing to embrace “green creden-
tials” as a competitive tool, understanding how top personality
characteristics such as CEO age influence organisational responses to
stakeholder pressure on GHG disclosure may help firms to establish
well-informed GHG reporting strategies thoughtfully.
Therefore, in this paper, we examine the relationship between
stakeholder pressure and GHG disclosures and how specific mana-
gerial characteristics moderate such a relationship. To achieve this,
we adopted a cross-sectional sample of 215 U.K. companies on the
FTSE 350 index listed on the London Stock Exchange using the
2011 annual and sustainability reports. The sample period of 2011
was selected for this study because disclosure of GHG emissions
by FTSE 350 was largely voluntary during this period. Following
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) guid-
ance in 2009, the first year that reflected companies' voluntary dis-
closure of GHG emissions was 2011. After its introduction in 2009,
companies that applied DEFRA guidance in 2010 had it reflected in
the 2011 disclosure report. Therefore, the year 2011 provides a
much realistic year that one of the frameworks, that is, DEFRA,
could have been realistically applied in disclosure. As a result, inves-
tigating how the voluntary reporting policy period influenced
policymakers to achieve the desired outcome during this period is
relevant.
Evidence from the study suggests that there is no substantial
shareholder and employee pressure on a firm to disclose GHG infor-
mation. However, there is a significant positive pressure from the
market status of a firm against those firms with additional market
share disclosing more GHG information. Also, we found that coercive
pressure, that is, regulatory pressure and mimetic pressures emanating
in some industries, notably industrials and consumer services, have a
significant favourable influence on firms' GHG disclosure decisions.
The findings also found creditor pressure to have a significantly nega-
tive relationship with GHG disclosure. In terms of the CEO character-
istics, the study finds CEO age to have a direct negative effect on
GHG voluntary disclosure and positively moderate the impact on reg-
ulatory pressure on GHG disclosure.
The research makes the following contributions to the disclo-
sure literature. First, the study provides evidence of the effect of
stakeholder's pressure on GHG reporting. By using the lens of insti-
tutional theory and the insights from the upper echelons theory,
we contribute to a growing body of literature that examines het-
erogeneous disclosure responses by firms to the same institutional
pressures. Second, the study sheds light on the joint effects of
CEO characteristics, stakeholders' pressures, and GHG disclosure.
Just like prior literature (e.g., Lewis et al., 2013), our inclusion of
CEO characteristics, that is, age, helps to highlight whether varia-
tions in corporate responses to mimetic, normative, and coercive
pressure can be explained by the characteristics of the actors.
Finally, unlike most previous studies, which tended to focus pre-
dominantly on the so-called “environmentally sensitive” industries,
ours focuses on a diverse range of industries. Emphasising the role
of CEO characteristics on the effect of stakeholder's pressure on
GHG reporting in such a diverse range of industries enhances the
understanding of the subject matter (De Villiers, Naiker, & Van
Staden, 2011).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents
the literature review and hypotheses development, and Section 3
describes the research design. Empirical results of the research are
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then discussed in Section 4, and the summary and conclusions are
presented in Section 4.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
2.1 | Theoretical framework
Current research has used many theories including institutional and
upper echelons theories to establish a link between stakeholder pres-
sures and environmental (including GHG) disclosure (Elmagrhi et al.,
2019; Haque & Ntim, 2018; Shahab et al., 2018; Shahab et al., 2019).
Deegan (2002) argued that there is often an overlap between the vari-
ous theories explaining disclosure. So it is not uncommon to use more
than one theory. For instance, the institutional theory is partly pre-
mised on the assumption that organisations respond to pressures
from institutional environments and adopt structures/procedures that
are socially accepted. With the organisational tendency to conform to
prevailing norms and traditions, the theory predicts that such behav-
iour will lead to homogeneity in structures and practices by organisa-
tions and that the same will be considered legitimate benchmarks for
any player within the industry. This similarity in form and processes is
what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) termed as “institutional
isomorphism.”
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) categorised the pressures faced by
organisations into three parts: mimetic, coercive, and normative.
Mimetic forces are pressures to copy other organisations' activities,
systems, and structures, and this arises when there is uncertainty or
no clear course of action. The uncertainty leads a firm to check com-
petitor/peer actions, and some researchers have documented evi-
dence that in uncertain times, firms tend to copy similar but more
abundant or more successful firms (Greve, 2000). Coercive forces
refer to external pressures primarily exerted by regulatory regimes or
other agencies on a firm leading them to follow a prescribed preferred
system. The pressure might also be as a result of contractual obliga-
tions restricting a firm to act in a particular pattern. Shahab et al.
(2018) and Wang, Jun, and Dingtao (2018) noted that the state's abil-
ity to impose its will upon organisations through the use of sanctions
is a primary regulatory mechanism of control and one that can induce
conformity. Normative forces are those pressures emerging from pro-
fessional standards or a professional community within the network
of the organisation. Professional ties or networks within an industry
act as a self-policing mechanism and have what Abrahamson and
Rosenkopf (1997) termed a “trickle-down” effect, which persuades
the firms to pursue similar actions as their colleagues.
Prior evidence indicates that firms do indeed respond to stake-
holder institutional pressures related to environmental matters. Lu
and Indra (2014) investigated the influence of stakeholders' power
and corporate characteristics on social and environmental disclosure
practices of socially responsible Chinese listed firms identified by a
social responsibility ranking list. Their studies found that shareholders
influence corporate social and environmental disclosures, whereas
creditors have an influence on corporate disclosures related to firm's
environmental performance. Tauringana and Chithambo (2015) used a
sample of 215 companies from a population of London Stock
Exchange FTSE 350 companies over 4 years (2008–2011), to examine
the effect of the 2009 guidance of the Department for Environment,
Food & Rural Affairs on GHG disclosure.
Their findings show that the publication of the 2009 guidance led
to a significant increase in GHG-level disclosure. Using the structural
equation modelling, Kalu, Buang, and Aliagha (2016) used a sample of
126 property sector companies listed in the Malaysia Stock Exchange
market based on the 2003 annual reports to determine the factors
influencing carbon disclosure in real estate companies in a developing
economy. The findings suggest that social and financial markets are
critical in influencing factors for carbon disclosure, whereas the eco-
nomic and institutional determinants do not achieve a significant
effect on voluntary carbon disclosure. Brammer and Pavelin (2006)
investigated voluntary environmental disclosures by U.K. companies.
They concluded that disclosure decisions were often a reflection of
managerial response to stakeholder pressure and that in part the
response was based on mitigating any possible government interven-
tion. Investigating the role of stakeholder pressure on environmental
disclosures, Darnall et al. (2010) came to the conclusion that factors
such as visibility, shareholding, and employee demands exert pressure
on management to disclose environmental information.
Overall, based on the prediction of institutional theory, manage-
rial decisions are influenced by coercive, mimetic, and normative iso-
morphism that tends to force firms experiencing similar pressure to
adopt prevailing norms and practices (Haque & Ntim, 2018; Shahab
et al., 2018). Among the three forces, coercive isomorphism is consid-
ered the primary/dominant force that moves managers to act
(Delmas & Toffel, 2004). However, although the expectation is that
coercive pressure should result in firms demonstrating homogenous
practices, there is growing evidence that, in practice, firms respond
heterogeneously (Lewis et al., 2013). Hence, there remains an empiri-
cal question as to why firms facing the same pressure should respond
differently. What we now know is that this could be as a result of par-
ticular characteristics of the firm, for example, history and culture
(Delmas & Toffel, 2008), and differences in how managers prioritise in
dealing with conflicting institutional pressures. A number of studies
have now begun to investigate the critical role of managerial attitude
plays in shaping the disclosure characteristics or culture of their
respective firms. However, as noted by Lewis et al. (2013), not much
has been done to highlight how certain managerial characteristics
influence a firm's response to institutional pressures relating to envi-
ronmental practices including disclosures.
The success of a modern corporation rests on how management
meets the demands and expectations of a diverse range of players
other than shareholders with available resources. Therefore, faced
with demands/pressure for more accountability and transparency,
managers have the responsibility to use means such as disclosures to
manage these demands. However, the way a manager responds to the
different kinds of stakeholder pressure is a product of many matters,
one of which is the managerial attitude towards the subject (Elmagrhi
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et al., 2019; Haque & Ntim, 2018; Shahab et al., 2018; Tauringana &
Chithambo, 2015).
According to the upper echelons theory (Hambrick, 2007), het-
erogeneous firm responses to the same institutional pressures can be
explained by the fact that managers have individual interpretations of
the same situation, and such interpretations are a product of the man-
agers' values, experience, and personality. Thus, the upper echelons
theory argues that in seemingly complex and uncertain situations, par-
ticular characteristics of responsible persons, that is, management,
tend to shape how a firm responds to the challenge it faces.
Voluntary disclosures are by nature discretionary and subjective;
hence, other than reflecting pressure a firm faces, it also demonstrates
the knowledge and interpretation that management assigns to such a
phenomenon (Delmas & Toffel, 2008). This partly explains why, when
faced with similar pressures, firms' disclosure responses are heteroge-
neous. Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella (2009) argue that disclo-
sure decisions are influenced by managerial backgrounds such as age,
tenure, and education. Therefore, based on both institutional and
upper echelons theories, the relationship to be investigated here is
illustrated in Figure 1.
2.2 | Empirical evidence and hypotheses
development
2.2.1 | Stakeholder pressure and GHG disclosure
Generally, shareholders are thought to be a constraining factor on
managers to engage in discretionary activities for fear of incurring
costs that may affect their wealth maximisation (Cooper et al., 2018).
However, there seems to be a change of mindset due to the number
of shareholders advocating ethical investment (da Rosa, Lunkes,
Margarete, & Brizzola, 2019). With the increase in public awareness
regarding the need for firms to be environmentally responsible, share-
holders realise that they risk losing their value/money if their com-
pany is identified as environmentally irresponsible (Buysse & Verbeke,
2003). Therefore, in circumstances where a firm is deemed
environmentally risky, shareholders may demand a high-risk premium
or may avoid or sell their shares (Lu & Indra, 2014).
Several prior studies (Cormier & Magnan, 2004; García-
Sánchez, Rodríguez-Domínguez, & Gallego-Alvarez, 2013; Lu &
Indra, 2014; Roberts, 1992) document that specific stakeholder
groups appear to influence corporate social and environmental dis-
closures. For instance, Deegan and Blomquist (2006) documented
evidence that the publication of the environmental scorecard by
the non-governmental organisation (NGO), the World Wildlife
Fund, led to changes in firms' environmental disclosures among
Australian mining companies. Similarly, Freedman and Jaggi (2005)
found evidence of how the ratification of the 2005 Kyoto protocol
induced several companies to disclose their GHG emissions.
Additionally, Reid and Toffel (2009) demonstrated a positive
association between stakeholder pressures and environmental
disclosure. Specifically, the authors found companies', which
participated in the Carbon Disclosure Project, voluntary disclosure
choice to be faced with more state-level pressure regarding climate
change concerns.
In a similar vein, Rankin, Windsor, and Wahyum (2011) adopted a
two-stage regression approach to examine how GHG reporting is
related to internal organisation systems, external privately
promulgated guidance, and European Union Emissions Trading System
trading among Australian companies. Evidence from the study found
that the presence and adoption of International Organization for
Standardization 14001-certified environmental management systems
had a significant impact on the extent and quality of GHG disclosures
by Australian companies. Other disclosure studies have documented
similar evidence (see Canace, Caylor, Johnson, & Lopez, 2010; Heflin,
Kross, & Suk, 2012).
Several other recent studies have also explored this relationship
from several perspectives. For instance, in an attempt to tie together
stakeholder and legitimacy theory arguments, examined the
relationship between stakeholder pressures and corporate
environmental disclosure on the Canadian firm Abitibi Consolidated.
Evidence from the study shows that in contrast to some of the stake-
holder groups, Abitibi Consolidated exhibited little interaction with
F IGURE 1 Theoretical model illustrating the
relationship between stakeholder pressure, CEO
age, and GHG emission voluntary disclosure. CEO,
chief executive officer; GHG, greenhouse gas
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respect to the timing of information flow. This was in contrast to prior
stakeholder-based investigations. The author attributes these findings
to the firm, not considering those groups as particularly relevant for
its legitimacy.
In this vein, Liesen et al. (2015) focused on stakeholder pressures
and the use of disclosure in a legitimating fashion across a broader
sample of 431 European firms. Evidence from their regression analysis
suggests that external stakeholder pressure is a determinant of the
existence but not the completeness of emissions disclosure. The find-
ings were consistent not only with stakeholder theory arguments that
suggest that companies respond to external stakeholder pressure to
report GHG emissions but also with legitimacy theory claims that
firms can use carbon disclosure as a symbolic act to address legitimacy
pressures.
Given the overall evidence from prior studies on the relation-
ship between stakeholder pressures and other environmental
disclosures, we expect firms with more significant stakeholders'
pressure concerns to be more likely to disclose their GHG emission
information. Against this backdrop, the following hypothesis is
formulated.
H1. Stakeholder pressure is positively associated with companies' choice
to disclose quantitative GHG emissions data.
2.2.2 | Ownership concentration and GHG
information disclosure
The pressure exerted by shareholders on firms' environmental disclo-
sure behaviour is dependent on the shareholding structure of the firm.
A company with a diverse range of shareholders is expected to deal
with wide-ranging demands for accountability and transparency
(Fraile & Fradejas, 2014). With dispersed ownership, there is no evi-
dence of a tight grip by shareholders on managerial activities as such,
that is, they do not possess insider information on most activities.
Therefore, to reduce information asymmetry between management
and shareholders, disclosure becomes paramount. Thus, the more dis-
persed the share ownership, the higher the need to monitor manage-
rial actions.
Alternatively, where there is a high concentration of owner-
ship, shareholders are deemed to have the power to possess
insider information, which tends to reduce their appetite for volun-
tary disclosure by management (Chau & Gray, 2002). Thus, block
holders' alignment with management undermines their monitoring
responsibility and often results in a conflict of interests with other
groups, such as minority shareholders. In this respect, high owner-
ship concentration is considered detrimental to voluntary disclo-
sures. Some prior studies have found evidence of this effect.
Matolcsy, Shan, and Seethamraju (2012) found that a high concen-
tration of ownership (represented by the percentage of shares
owned by the top 20 shareholders) had a negative association with
disclosures. Similarly, Brammer and Pavelin (2008) found that firms
with high ownership concentration in the United Kingdom had
fewer disclosures of the quantity and quality of environmental
information. In this respect, we, therefore, anticipate that firms
with a high ownership concentration will have low levels of GHG
emission disclosures.
H2. High share ownership concentration will be negatively associated
with GHG emission voluntary disclosures.
2.2.3 | Employees and GHG information disclosure
Increased awareness of environmental issues has made employees
realise that any negative perception of a firm being environmen-
tally irresponsible risks its going concern and also threatens their
employment prospects. Besides, Chiu and Sharfman (2011) argue
that firms deemed environmentally irresponsible are likely to find it
hard to attract high-quality employees and customers who value
green credentials. The pressure exerted by employees is dependent
on their number and organisation within a firm. The greater
the number of employees, the higher the chances that their envi-
ronmental concerns will be taken seriously by management.
Employees with well-established unions are also expected to hold
more bargaining power that can force management to adopt
and disclose more environmental or GHG information (Huang &
Kung, 2010).
It is also understood that, as part of the resource base of a firm,
employees hold the key to a firm's success regarding its environmen-
tal initiatives. Prior evidence demonstrates that participation and
involvement of employees help a firm develop and embed its green
competencies within its operations (Cooper et al., 2018; Ramus &
Steger, 2000). We therefore anticipate that firms with a large number
of employees have both the pressure and the resources/manpower to
enable them to build the competencies to report more GHG
information.
H3. Companies with large numbers of employees will disclose more GHG
information voluntarily.
2.2.4 | Creditors and GHG information disclosure
Creditors influence on a firm rests on the need to safeguard their
interests so much so that when they notice any deviation from agreed
terms, they can alter their support/relationship with the firm, thereby
affecting its operations (Brammer & Millington, 2004). This may take
the form of recalling loans or preventing credit extensions (Huang &
Kung, 2010; Tauringana & Chithambo, 2015). More importantly, any-
thing that negatively affects a firm such as environmental cases, which
may attract penalties and adverse public reaction, concerns creditors
as these may prevent a firm meeting its outstanding obligation to
them. Therefore, to ensure that they are kept updated on the status
of a firm, creditors demand firms be transparent and disclose more
information, including environmental risks. Failure to disclose more
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details may force the creditors to withdraw their support from the
firm (Huang & Kung, 2010).
H4. Gearing is expected to have a positive and significant association
with voluntary GHG disclosures.
2.2.5 | Regulatory pressure and GHG information
disclosure
According to Delmas and Toffel (2004, p. 213), regulatory pressure
refers “to the extent to which regulators threaten to or actually
impede a company's operations based on their environmental perfor-
mance.” Thus, regulatory stakeholders have the power to penalise and
constrain a firm from engaging in environmentally damaging activities.
Managers can, therefore, use disclosure of information, such as GHG
emission and environmental management, to help improve the per-
ception of regulators and as a way of limiting frequent regulatory
intervention (Elmagrhi et al., 2019). Thus, firms failing to adhere to
regulatory pronouncements risk severe penalties, licence revocation,
and intense public scrutiny through the media.
Prior evidence indicates that managers engage in voluntary envi-
ronmental initiatives and disclosure in response to regulation
(Stanny & Ely, 2008). In recent times, there has been an increased
level of government activities aiming to encourage initiatives towards
climate change and GHG emission. This includes the enactment of the
Climate Change Act 2008 and subsequent issuance of DEFRA (2009)
guidance on measurement and reporting of GHGs. Furthermore, the
government announced the mandatory reporting of GHGs beginning
April 2013.
Besides, regulatory pressure has also been instrumental in
encouraging firms to adopt privately initiated reporting regimes as a
way of encouraging good behaviour. Delmas (2002) argues that gov-
ernment influence was behind the adoption of International Organiza-
tion for Standardization 14001 by many firms because by endorsing
the standard, coercive pressure was exerted on firms to adopt the
same if they were to be deemed environmentally responsible. In liter-
ature, regulatory pressure has been proxied by several variables.
These include the name of regulatory inspections or violations and
enforcement action taken on a firm, the number of government-level
environmental initiatives launched in a period, and the firm size
(Huang & Kung, 2010).
In this study, we adopt corporate size. We argue that the larger
the firm, the more susceptible it may be to public scrutiny and hence
governmental intervention (Haque & Ntim, 2018). It is also under-
stood that large firms are deemed resource capable of meeting the
pollution abatement costs and related disclosure costs (Freedman &
Jaggi, 2005). The availability of resources is paramount when dealing
with climate-related issues, which in most cases require significant
changes to the way a firm conducts its business.
H5. Regulatory pressure is expected to have a positive and significant
association with voluntary GHG disclosures.
2.2.6 | Suppliers and customers and GHG
information disclosure
Suppliers and customers are often referred to as value chain
stakeholders. They are also known to be influential in making a firm
adopt transparency and accountability within its operations (Darnall
et al., 2010; Sarkis, Gonzalez-Torre, & Adenso-Diaz, 2010). Noted that
there is an increasing trend towards green consumerism, which can
only be ignored by firms at their peril. Consumers, aware of the
devastating effects of environmental damage, demand that their
suppliers of goods and services are transparent and accountable in
their operations' impact on the environment. Delmas and Montiel
(2007) noted that it was becoming fashionable for corporate
customers to demand their suppliers' certification in environmental
management practices. This is done to limit any reputation risk
damage that may arise as a result of sourcing from firms/clients
deemed environmentally irresponsible, which may result in increasing
environmental liability.
When suppliers or customers perceive or realise that a firm is
deemed a high environmental risk, they may terminate their contract
or revise the terms of their relationship with the firm. However, as
noted by Hill and Jones (2004), there is always an interdependent
relationship between a firm and its supplier chain so much that each
has the motivation to ensure that the other party does engage in
activities that may not strain the relationship. Thus, buyers/customers
are often accustomed to transacting with their suppliers, so change is
not always easy. In contrast, a firm whose supplier contract has been
terminated abruptly might suffer financial consequences when
attempting to enter new deals. Therefore, it is argued that a firm with
a high stock turnover and which places heavy reliance on its supplier
chain will ensure that the suppliers' demands are satisfied in order to
avoid disrupting its business interests in the event of a boycott due to
environmental credentials. Therefore, when firms are disclosing GHG
environmental information, while addressing the needs of other
stakeholders, they ensure that the needs of customers and suppliers
are met. Nonetheless, it is the extent to which a firm controls the
market that helps shape its value chain relationship (Porter, 2008);
hence, in this study, we use market share to represent value chain
pressure on firm GHG disclosure decisions.
H6. Firms with a large supply chain are expected to disclose more GHG
information.
2.2.7 | Social stakeholders (media, NGOs, and
community) and GHG information disclosure
Social stakeholders have the power and means to exert pressure on a
firm to adopt environmentally friendly policies. These among other
things include mobilising public opinion against patronising the ser-
vices and products of a firm, participating in their local elections to
ensure that people who share their environmental beliefs are ushered
into office and will legislate against irresponsible firm behaviour, and
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by also filing individual lawsuits against a firm (Delmas & Toffel,
2004). Prior studies have indicated that managers take social stake-
holder pressure seriously, and in return, they respond through ade-
quate disclosure of their actions (Kock, Santaló, & Diestre, 2012; Lu &
Indra, 2014). NGOs and media often target firms deemed as environ-
mentally irresponsible with negative publicity, which is potentially
damaging.
Pollution-related issues are controversial and attract a great deal
of public opinion when a firm is deemed environmentally irresponsi-
ble. Several private environmental organisations have been
established alongside various governmental departments to help mon-
itor pollution levels. Evidence shows that pressure differs depending
on the industry with those classified as environmentally sensitive
being under more scrutiny than their counterparts. In turn, firms oper-
ating in these industries disclose more information as a way of passing
the scrutiny test (Cho & Patten, 2007). Spar and La Mure (2003) dem-
onstrated that NGO pressure had become a dominant part of the
senior executives psychology to the extent that they are pushed to
make more environmentally related disclosure without considering
the cost benefit of the same.
H7. Social stakeholder pressure will have a positive and significant asso-
ciation with a firm's voluntary GHG disclosure.
2.2.8 | CEO characteristics, stakeholder pressure,
and GHG information disclosure
Prior literature indicates that concern for the environment often
varies with age, with younger generations showing more concern
for the environment than older generations (Shahab et al., 2019).
Age has also been used as a proxy for managerial risk attitude, with
older managers considered more risk averse than younger managers
(Tauringana & Chithambo, 2015). In other studies, other than dis-
closure, the impact of age has been explored and found to exert
statistically significant influence. These include older age individuals
having a positive association with risk aversion in portfolio holdings
(Shahab et al., 2019) and former managers being conservative in
matters of corporate expenditure and gearing levels (Bertrand &
Schoar, 2003). Psychology-based evidence suggests that risk aver-
sion increases with age (Farag & Mallin, 2016), implying that as an
individual grows older, they tend to be less aggressive in their
approach. Consistent with these findings, our study suggests that
the age of the CEO will have a bearing on the GHG disclosure
style that is meant to manage stakeholder pressure, with older
CEOs exhibiting disclosure constraining styles compared with
younger ones.
Drawing on the upper echelons theory, we understand that
executives' tenure affects their cognition, which in turn affects
their behaviour (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Thus, the more established
the managers are, the more they are used to routines and prac-
tices, thereby making them loath to adopt new styles. So our prop-
osition for control is that the longer the CEO stays in post, the
more reluctant they will be to manage stakeholders' pressure for
climate change through voluntary disclosure. On the other hand,
CEO education is included on the basis that those who are well
educated will have a good understanding of climate change issues
and also the ability/skill to champion voluntary GHG emission
reporting.
H8. CEO characteristics positively moderate the relationship between
stakeholder pressure and the extent of GHG disclosures
information.
3 | RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 | Sample selection
The population for the study consists of London Stock Exchange
FTSE 350 listed firms as of September 30, 2011. The data were taken
from the annual reports and DataStream database. The sample period
is selected because the disclosure of GHG emissions by FTSE
350 was largely voluntary during this period. To arrive at our sample,
93 financial sector firms, which included banks, insurance companies,
investment trusts, unit trusts, and real estate companies, were
excluded from the sample because they are subject to different disclo-
sure and statutory requirements (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). Of the
remaining 257 firms, 42 firms were excluded based on either under-
going significant restructuring in the year or had no corporate office
in the United Kingdom. This meant that our sample consisted of
215 firms.
3.2 | Quantifying GHGs disclosure
Unlike previous studies (e.g., Prado-Lorenzo, Rodriguez-Dominquez,
Gallego-Alvarez, & Garcia-Sanchez, 2009), which based their list
of items from one GHG disclosure guidance framework, we
included all relevant elements from several GHG reporting
frameworks such as DEFRA (2009). The final index had 60 items
consisting of 34 items relating to qualitative disclosures and
26 quantitative disclosures. To quantify the GHG disclosures made
in the annual reports, sustainability reports, and websites of the
firms in 2011, content analysis technique was used. Literature sug-
gests that the quantification of the disclosure can either be done
on a weighted or un-weighted basis (Jaggi, Allini, Macchioni, &
Zagaria, 2017). An un-weighted approach has been adopted for this
study, which is most appropriate when no importance is given to
any specific user groups. A company is awarded a score of “1” for
the disclosed item and “0” if not disclosed. However, the company
is not penalised if the item does not apply. The total disclosure
index score is then captured for each sample firm as a ratio of the
overall disclosure score divided by the maximum possible disclosure
for the company. The disclosure index for each company is then
expressed as a percentage.
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3.3 | Econometric modelling
Due to the nature of the data, the study employed a series of cross-
sectional multiple regression techniques to estimate the relationship.
The results are presented in two models. Model 1 estimates the
impact of stakeholders' pressure on GHG disclosure information.
Model 2 presents the results of the interaction effect of CEO charac-
teristics on the relationship between stakeholder pressure and GHG
disclosure information. These models are presented below:
GHGDISx = β0 + β1Stakeholder Pressurex
+ β2CEOCharacteristicsx +Controlsx + ε,
ð1Þ
GHGDISx = β0 + β1Stakeholder Pressurex
+ β2CEOCharacteristicsx
+ β3Stakeholder Pressurex*CEOCharacteristicsx
+ β4Controlsx + ε,
ð2Þ
where GHG DIS denotes GHG disclosure index, Stakeholder Pressure
is a matrix of the main independent variable of interest denoted by
Ownership Concentration (OWCON) Employees, Gearing, Company
size (Size), and Marktshare. CEO characteristics include CEOagex,
CEO educationx, and CEO tenurex, whereas the controls include
Profitability and Board size; ε is the error term, and β represents the
vectors of parameters to be estimated. A detailed description of all
the variables is presented in Table 1.
4 | EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
4.1 | Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the paper are provided
in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 mainly focusses on the extent of disclosure
with respect to the disclosure index used in this study. Overall, more
qualitative disclosures are made compared with quantitative ones. On
the qualitative disclosures, the most frequently reported item was the
actions/measures taken to reduce/mitigate climate change impact
with almost 96% of the firms reporting this. This could suggest the
desire on the part of firms to shift the focus of their target audience
away from their actual impact on climate change to intended actions.
The least disclosed qualitative information was the supplier and the
name of the purchased green tariff. The results also show that 71% of
firms disclosed their reporting framework guidelines, whereas only
31% revealed that they had obtained assurance services on their
GHG emissions reporting.
The most frequently reported quantitative item was the
total GHG emissions in CO2 metric tonnes, which was published by
84% of the companies. However, evidence indicates low levels of
GHG quantitative disclosure per scope. For example, only 29% of the
firms reported their GHG emissions per scope 1. Dragomir
(2012) reported similar findings and noted that a sample of companies
comprising BP, Total, Shell, BG Group, and Eni had largely disclosed
TABLE 1 Variable measurement description
Symbol Full name Stakeholder pressure Measurement
GHG DISx GHG disclosure index N/A Disclosure score expressed as a ratio of the total
possible score, that is, 60
OWCONx Ownership
concentration
Shareholder pressure Proportion of ownership by shareholders with 3%
or more
Employeesx Employees Employee pressure Number of people employed by the company
Gearingx Gearing Creditor pressure Ratio between total debt and total shareholders'
equity
Sizex Company size Regulatory pressure Total assets expressed as natural log
Marktsharex Market share Supplier and customer pressure Total turnover expressed as proportion of total
turnover of firms in the sample drawn from the
same industry
Industryx Industry Social stakeholders (media, non-governmental
organisations, and community pressure)
An industry to which a firm belong represented as
dummy, that is, 1 if belonging to that industry
otherwise 0
CEOagex CEO age N/A Age of the CEO expressed in years
CEOtenurex CEO tenure N/A Period the CEO has been in office (expressed in
months)
CEOeducationx CEO education Control Type of qualification possessed by CEO
(expressed as dummy, i.e., 1 with a bachelor's
degree and/or above and 0 if only in possession
of any qualification lower than bachelor's
degree)
Profitabilityx Profitability Control Profit after tax, divided by total assets
Boardsizex Board size Control Company x's total number of people making up
the board of directors
Abbreviations: CEO, chief executive officer; GHG, greenhouse gas.
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to total firms (%)
Qualitative disclosures
1 Institutional background 213 99
2 Period covered by the report 212 98
3 Statement on company position on climate change and
related responsibilities
202 94
4 Corporate governance on climate change 191 88
5 Climate change opportunities and company strategies 137 63
6 Climate change impact on business operations
including supply chains
111 51
7 Identification of regulatory risks as a result of climate
change
67 31
8 Identification of all other risks as a result of climate
change
92 43
9 Actions/measures taken to reduce/mitigate climate
change impact
207 96
10 Adaptation strategies to climate change effects 103 48
11 Regulated schemes to which a firm belongs 79 37
12 Reporting guidelines used in GHG reporting 135 63
13 An assurance statement on disclosed information 58 27
14 Contact or responsible person for GHG reporting 163 75
15 Organisation boundary and consolidation approach 98 45
16 Base year 126 58
17 Explanation for a change in base year 69 32
18 GHGs covered including those not required by Kyoto
protocol
68 31
19 Sources and sinks used/excluded 88 41
20 Conversion factors used/methodology used to
measure or calculate emissions
83 38
21 Explanation for any changes to methodology or
conversion factors previously used
64 30
22 A list of facilities included in the inventory for GHG
emissions
37 17
23 Information on the quality of the inventory e.g. causes
and magnitude of uncertainties in estimates
13 6
24 Information on any GHG sequestration 37 17
25 Disclosure of the supplier and the name of the
purchased green tariff
13 6
26 Explanations for changes in performance of total GHG
emissions in CO2 metric tonnes
154 71
27 Explanation of any country excluded if global total is
reported
111 51
28 Explanations for changes in performance of scope 1
emissions
69 32
29 Details of any specific exclusion of emissions from
scope 1
55 25
30 Explanation for the reason of any exclusion from
scope 1
45 21
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GHG emissions in total rather than in scopes. Overall, there was a lack
of quantitative information relating to future estimates of emissions
and quantifiable estimates of regulatory risks arising from climate
change.
From Table 3, in 2011, the mean disclosure of GHG information
was about 38% (0.38), whereas the lowest and highest disclosure
levels were 5% (0.05) and 88% (0.88), respectively. The mean disclo-






to total firms (%)
32 Details of any specific exclusion of emissions from
scope 2
53 25
33 Explanation for the reason of any exclusion from scope
2
44 20




35 Total GHG emissions in CO2 metric tonnes 170 79
36 Comparative data of total GHG emissions in CO2
metric tonnes
159 74
37 Future estimates of total GHG emissions in CO2 metric
tonnes
15 7
38 GHG emission by business unit/type/country 123 57
39 GHG removals quantified in tonnes of CO2e 43 20
40 Scope 1 emissions 63 29
41 Comparative data on scope 1 emissions 56 26
42 Future estimates of scope 1 emissions 3 1
43 Scope 2 emissions 62 29
44 Comparative data on scope 2 emissions 54 25
45 Future estimates of scope 2 emissions 5 2
46 Scope 3 emissions 50 23
47 Comparative data on scope 3 emissions 45 21
48 Future estimates of scope 3 emissions 3 1
49 Emission of direct CO2 reported separately from
scopes
95 44
50 Emission not covered by Kyoto and reported
separately from scopes
95 44
51 Emission attributable to own generation of electricity/
heat/steam sold or transferred to another organ
116 54
52 Emission attributable to own generation of electricity/
heat/steam purchased for resale to end users
63 29
53 For purchased green tariff state the reduction in
tonnes of CO2e per year
17 8
54 Additional carbon saving associated with the tariff as a
percentage
5 2
55 Quantitative data estimates of the regulatory risks as a
result of climate change
1 0
56 Quantitative data estimates of all other risks as a result
of climate change
2 1
57 GHG emission performance measurement against
internal and external benchmarks including ratios
105 49
58 GHG emission targets set and achieved 139 64
59 GHG emission offsets information 48 22
60 Comparative information on targets set and achieved 133 62
Abbreviation: GHG, greenhouse gas.
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disclosure), the extent of voluntary GHG disclosure by FTSE 350, is
still considered marginal or unsatisfactory. Our sampled firms ranged
from £51.50 million to £345.257 million with a mean of £10,622.72
million in size, indicating that overall, the sample had relatively large
firms. Our CEO mean age of 52.18 years suggests that FTSE 350 firms
are to a large extent dominated by mature CEOs. There was also a sig-
nificant variability with regard to profitability, gearing, and ownership
structure. For instance, firms in the sample had reported a return on
assets ranging from a minimum of −16.14% to a maximum of
120.38% in 2011. On average, the majority of the sampled firms were
highly geared (mean of 1.54) and had high levels of ownership con-
centration (maximum of 89.20) taking into account the fact that the
maximum number of shareholders with more than 3% was 15.
4.2 | Correlation between dependent and
independent variables
Table 3 also shows the correlation between all variables used in the
study. As expected, GHG disclosure is positively related to size,
employees, market share, and board size. CEO age, gearing, ownership
concentration, and profitability are negatively correlated with GHG
disclosures. However, it is only ownership concentration whose rela-
tionship is significant. There were also some significant correlations
between independent variables, with the highest being that of firm
size and board size, and firm size and market share both at 0.43. How-
ever, this is considered no threat as it falls below the maximum
threshold of 0.8 or 0.9, as recommended by Field (2009). Although
our correlation matrix does not depict very high significant correla-
tions among the independent variables, we also analysed the variance
inflation factor (VIF). According to Field (2009), low values of VIF are
expected if multicollinearity problem is to be under control. Our mean
VIF was 1.93, and the highest VIF was 4.13 for size, and this is below
the maximum benchmark of 10. This then means that multicollinearity
is not prevalent in our model.
To control for heteroscedasticity in the standard errors, we used
the option of robust in Stata (Greene, 2008). Thus, apart from just
addressing heteroscedasticity issues, the robust option deals with
other minor concerns bordering on failure to meet other assumptions
such as normality or excessively large residuals or influence from a
particular variable. Therefore, without altering the point estimates of
the coefficient as derived from ordinary least squares, with the robust
option, standard errors adjust for any concerns of data abnormality or
heteroscedasticity.
4.3 | Multivariate results and discussion
Firm size was significant at p < .001, hence confirming the basis of
our hypothesis that due to greater visibility and associated political
costs, larger firms disclose more GHG information as a matter of
diffusing public attention. Gearing has a negative and significant
relationship with GHG disclosures (p < .001). This then implies that
creditor pressure on a firm may result in less disclosure of GHGs.
Our results also show a positive but insignificant relationship
between market share and GHG disclosures. Although we find
insignificant results, previous studies (Mahadeo, Oogarah-
Hanuman, & Soobaroyen, 2011; Lu & Indra, 2014) show that firms
that are considered industry leaders take a leading role in setting
the disclosure pace. The negative and significant relationship
between ownership concentration and GHG disclosures confirms
our hypothesis and means that firms with a high concentration of
ownership structure have little shareholder pressure on them to
disclose more GHGs information.
The relationship between employees and GHG disclosures is neg-
ative and nonsignificant, meaning that there is a lack of evidence of
employees demanding more GHG disclosures from their employers.
One reason for this could be the timing of the study. The year 2011,
being in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent
recession, saw companies downsizing that might have affected the
priorities of employees. Of all the variables representing industry sen-
sitivity, only those under industrials and consumer services were posi-
tive and statistically significant. Concerning CEO characteristics, our
results indicate a negative and significant relationship at p < .05
between GHG disclosures and CEO age, which was a proxy for mana-
gerial risk attitude. This implies that the older the CEO, the less GHG
disclosures their firms make. As well as being risk averse, the result
confirms assertions that older CEOs have less concern for the envi-
ronment than their younger counterparts (Schaper, 2002). Though in
line with our set hypothesis, it contradicts some prior studies on dis-
closure: Bamber et al. (2010) failed to find support for the relationship
between managers' observable demographic characteristics and the
disclosure of accounting information. When the variable CEO age is
interacted with the respective stakeholder pressure variables in order
to understand how stakeholder pressure on firm's GHG disclosure
behaviour varies with the characteristics of the accountability officers,
that is, CEO. Overall, our results show no significant effect of the
interaction of CEO age and the stakeholder pressure on GHG disclo-
sures with the exception of regulatory pressure as proxied by size.
Of the control variables, only board size turned out significant and
positive, suggesting that the large-sized board often leads to a more
disclosure of GHG information. The results are consistent with prior
studies (Peters & Romi, 2012). As argued by Tauringana and
Chithambo (2015), board size has a positive relationship with environ-
mental performance and GHG disclosures. The coefficient for profit-
ability is statistically insignificant, meaning that the level of
profitability does not influence the level of voluntary GHG disclosures.
This result is in line with prior studies (Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Rankin
et al., 2011; Stanny & Ely, 2008; Wegner, Elayan, Felton, & Li, 2013).
4.4 | Robustness checks
The robustness of results was obtained through the transformation
of the industry variable. Prior studies (Freedman & Jaggi, 2005;
Rankin et al., 2011) categorise the industries differently, and in this
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study, our classification is primarily based on Industry Benchmark
Classification, which resulted in nine industries after excluding
financial sector. Cho, Guidry, Hageman, and Patten (2012) noted
that variations in industry classification might affect the outcome,
hence calling for careful scrutiny as to how industry variables are
included in models. We then reclassified the industry variable into
just one dummy variable using the Times 1000 industry
categorisation, based on environmental risks.
When the industry variable is transformed into one dummy
variable, and the primary regression model is rerun, there is a
minor change to the results. The industry dummy becomes nega-
tive and nonsignificant. Apart from industry transformation, we also
noticed that prior research had proxied size and profitability with
different measures; hence, we reran our main model with varying
measures for size and profitability. Thus, we used total revenue for
size (instead of total assets) and return on equity for profitability
(instead of return on assets), and the results (not included here)
are consistent with the primary model. In addition, various corpo-
rate governance characteristics, that is, the presence of indepen-
dent nonexecutive directors and environmental committee, have
also been included in prior studies (see Tauringana & Chithambo,
2015); therefore, we also ran a separate model with these as con-
trols, and the results were not materially different from the main
model.
4.5 | Discussion
Regulatory pressure, as proxied by firm size, has a positive and signifi-
cant relationship with voluntary GHG disclosure. As noted, being large
means being very visible and subject to intense public scrutiny, which
may then force a firm to make more disclosures as a way of deflating
criticism. The regulatory pressure in the United Kingdom could also be
seen from the activities of the government with respect to GHG
reporting. So far, the voluntary reporting regime through DEFRA
(2009) guidance and following mandatory requirements for GHG dis-
closure issued in September 2013 have targeted the top FTSE
350 companies. Besides, being large is also synonymous with being
resource-rich, which may enable managers to exercise more flexibility
in their disclosure decisions, unlike in small firms where resources are
deemed in short supply (Reverte, 2008). More voluntary disclosure by
large firms is also often seen as a means of keeping pace or help
define/pre-empt the extent to which any regulation may be set. The
result also agrees with prior evidence (Berthelot & Robert, 2012;
Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Rankin et al.,
2011).
Concerning creditor pressure, our results suggest that firms
with significant creditor pressure, as reflected in their capital struc-
ture, are inclined to disclose less GHG emissions voluntarily. Argu-
ably, creditors may be interested in other disclosures that may
have a direct bearing on their financial interest in the firm; hence,
firms may meet those expectations by providing more of the finan-
cial disclosures at the expense of the environmental disclosures.
The result both contradicts and agrees with some empirical evi-
dence. Huang and Kung (2010) reported that creditors had a signif-
icant favourable influence on Taiwanese firms' disclosure of
environmental information. On the other hand, Brammer and
Pavelin (2008) found that firms' disclosure of environmental infor-
mation had a negative relationship with financial gearing. Others
have found gearing insignificant (Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Prado-
Lorenzo et al., 2009; Rankin et al., 2011).
The results show that the pressure exerted by suppliers and cus-
tomers results in a positive and significant effect on voluntary GHG
disclosure. One explanation could be that industry leaders understand
that due to their visibility, they are likely targets for any future regula-
tion in this respect; hence, their disclosure could be interpreted as a
tactic or ploy to pre-empt or limit regulatory intervention that could
be costly. It could also be a sign that part of the strategy to maintain
their market share is through satisfactorily addressing the ever-
increasing “green” demands of their suppliers and customers. Despite
prior literature documenting evidence of an increase in investors
interested in ethical and green investments, existing shareholders of
FTSE 350 (mostly those categorised as being highly concentrated)
have a negative and significant relationship with voluntary GHG dis-
closure. This could be due to the fact that these shareholders have
other means of accessing information on the firm than through public
disclosure (Chau & Gray, 2002). In the case of GHGs, it could be
argued that other avenues like Carbon Disclosure Project disclosures
are used or encouraged by institutional investors; hence, they may
not find it worthwhile to encourage managers to disclose GHG infor-
mation in other media.
Social stakeholder pressure as represented by industry
categorisation has had a mixed outcome with only two industries,
that is, industrials and consumer services as having a positive and
significant effect on voluntary GHG disclosure whereas the rest
were not statistically significant. Although these may not be classi-
fied as “heavy polluting” industries in the strict sense, they inter-
face with a highly sensitive consumer base whose reaction to
environmental matters might have significant economic conse-
quences for these firms. There is evidence that consumers are
increasingly demanding firms to demonstrate their green credentials
(Lee, Park, & Klassen, 2013). Nonetheless, those firms in heavy pol-
luting industries may feel that more disclosures may further expose
them. Hence, they may not be forthcoming when it comes to
transparency and accountability of their emissions (Wegner et al.,
2013). In contrast, less environmentally risky industries may dis-
close more as a way of pre-empting any potential regulation that
might be costly to comply with.
Being a variable that was also used to reflect the pressure
exerted by NGOs, media, and other environmental lobbyists, the
nonsignificance of most industry categories may suggest less influ-
ence of these groups or the ability of those industries to deal with
such pressures. Friedman and Miles (2002) argued that the rela-
tionship between a corporation and NGOs is often noncontractual,
and in most cases, they do not need each other to survive. Hence,
management often disregards the wishes of these groups by simply
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branding them as “fanatics.” Sarkis et al. (2010) made a similar
observation, arguing that pressure from the media is not enough to
force firms to invest in systems that help the implementation of
environmental practices. Similarly, Fiedler and Deegan (2002) found
that pressure from specific vital stakeholders, such as the govern-
ment, is what forces some firms to begin to respond to the pres-
sure exerted by NGOs. Thus, through their engagement or
communication with public and governmental organisations, envi-
ronmental lobby groups can exert pressure on firms (Broadstock,
Collins, Hunt, & Vergos, 2018).
The negative but significant association between CEO age and
voluntary GHG disclosure means that managerial characteristics play
a role in disclosure decisions. Under the upper echelons theory, older
CEOs are likely to exhibit conservative traits and hubris (Dang,
Henry, & Hoang, 2017). Thus, being old is also associated with resis-
tance to change (Musteen, Vincent, & Virginia, 2006). This means that
faced with stakeholder pressure, the response of older CEOs is likely
to differ from that of younger, short-tenured ones. Generally, it is
expected that the former will resist any pressure to disclose more
GHG information and instead rely on other tactics in managing
stakeholder expectations. Found evidence of older and conservative
CEOs resisting change and innovation in favour of their trusted
existing strategies, and the same might be the case with GHG
disclosure.
However, our results also show no significant impact of the
interaction of CEO age and the stakeholder pressure on GHG
disclosures except for regulatory pressure as proxied by size. The
effect of CEO age on regulatory pressure makes a significant
negative impact on GHG disclosures. Mature CEOs are considered
a “safe” pair of hands with an extensive network extending to the
corridors of regulatory agencies, which may then make them handle
pressure emanating from that source with more competency than
their younger counterparts. In the light of our earlier findings, we
interpret this as implying that CEO intervention in the disclosure
TABLE 4 Multiple regression models
Variable
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Size 0.064*** 0.021 0.311** 0.128
Gearing −0.002*** 0.001 0.037 0.158
Ownership concentration −0.002** 0.001 −0.003 0.007
CEO age −0.005** 0.003 0.008 0.02
Board size 0.151** 0.07 0.165** 0.073
Profitability −0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.001
Employees −0.003 0.016 −0.122 0.087
Market share 0.017 0.012 −0.008 0.009
CEO education 0.0278 0.023 −0.008 0.009
CEO tenure −0.0105 0.014 −0.011 0.014
Industrials 0.192*** 0.071 0.199*** 0.067
Consumer services 0.145** 0.075 0.163** 0.073
Consumer goods and services 0.089 0.073 0.093 0.071
Utilities 0.0.052 0.082 0.095 0.095
Oil and gas 0.053 0.086 0.078 0.085
Basic materials 0.082 0.086 0.084 0.083
Technology 0.056 0.071 0.067 0.068
Telecommunication 0.002 0.118 0.018 0.114
Size × CEO age — — −0.004** 0.002
Ownership × CEO age — — 0.00005 0.0001
Gearing × CEO age — — −0.001 0.002
Employees × CEO age — — 0.003* 0.001
Market share × CEO age — — 0.0001 0.0002
R2 .379 .394
Adjusted R2 .318 .313
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pattern is independent of any particular stakeholder pressure. Thus,
their negative association with GHG disclosures and their lack of
influence when interacted with stakeholder pressure may imply that
their characteristics may have a bearing on the final product, that
is, disclosures than stakeholder pressure due to other institutional
factors. It could be argued that in most cases, the task or role of
managing stakeholders is entrusted to different departments or indi-
viduals other than the CEO. Delmas and Toffel (2008) found that
among others, marketing and legal departments influence firms'
responses to institutional pressures.
The other CEO characteristics such as education and tenure inter-
acted with the respective stakeholder pressure variables but did not
have any significant association. As a result, these have not been
reported in Table 4.
5 | CONCLUSION AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
There is a recognition that more need to be done to reverse the
trend of environmental pollution, in particular, the emission of
GHGs. Companies, amidst policy uncertainty, have been engaging
in various voluntary initiatives to demonstrate their green creden-
tials and have been publicising their efforts through disclosures.
Empirical studies investigating the rationale for these voluntary dis-
closures are growing. However, there are still unanswered ques-
tions relating to which stakeholders exert significant pressure on
firms to make these disclosures. In this study, using institutional
theory and insights from the upper echelons theory, we investi-
gated the role of various stakeholders in influencing firms' GHG
disclosure behaviour.
The findings indicate that regulatory pressure (firm size), cus-
tomer and supplier pressure (market share), and social stakeholder
pressure (industry categorised as industrials and consumer services)
have a statistically significant positive relationship with GHG disclo-
sure, whereas creditor pressure (gearing), shareholder pressure (own-
ership concentration), and CEO age had a significant negative
influence. CEO age moderation effect on stakeholder pressure, nota-
bly regulatory pressure, was found. Generally, the results suggest that
there is no substantial shareholder and employee pressure on a firm
to disclose GHG information. However, there is a significant positive
pressure from the market status of a firm from those firms with more
market share, disclosing more GHG information. Consistent with the
predictions of institutional theory, the study finds evidence that coer-
cive pressure, that is, regulatory pressure and mimetic pressures ema-
nating in some industries notably industrials and consumer services,
have a significant positive influence on firms' GHG disclosure
decisions.
This study contributes to a growing body of literature investigat-
ing why, when facing seemingly homogenous pressure from stake-
holders, firms respond heterogeneously (Lewis et al., 2013). Just like
Lewis et al. (2013), our inclusion of CEO characteristics, such as age,
helps to highlight whether variations incorporating the characteristics
of the actors can explain responses to mimetic, normative, and coer-
cive pressure. The findings on the significant negative relationship
between GHG disclosures and CEO age suggest that besides exclu-
sively focussing on investments in new technology and systems to
help collect and report GHG information with the intention of even-
tual emission control, company owners, through the board structures,
can also focus on the characteristics of the CEO in their recruitment
drive. As Lewis et al. (2013) argued, environmental disclosure deci-
sions are fraught with uncertainty so much so that they reflect the
perception of decision-makers, which in turn is influenced by their
characteristics.
Other prior studies have also found CEOs to be influential in set-
ting the tone of an organisation strategy towards innovation and other
entrepreneurial activities; hence, a full picture of GHG disclosure deci-
sions can be obtained if particular characteristics of CEOs are carefully
scrutinised. The practical implication of our study is therefore that
CEOs should not just be recruited or appointed haphazardly or just
with financial goals in mind. Instead, the board should also take into
consideration characteristics that will align with broader organisational
goals that encompass environmental or GHG emissions control tar-
gets. The significance of board size is also of paramount
importance/interest to policymakers as it highlights potential areas of
regulatory focus on firms if real emission reductions are to be achieved
through any future disclosure regulation. The study has also gone
beyond the tradition of exclusively focussing on industries deemed as
heavy polluters and has included all the possible sectors in determining
the extent of disclosure. De Villiers et al. (2011) argued against just
studying specific industries under the justification that those industries
are heavy polluters because such results tend to be precise and lim-
ited. This then means that our study with such a broad industry base
and disclosure index increases the generalisability of the results.
Notwithstanding, insights gained from this study identify that
there were a number of limitations upon which future studies might
be concentrated. The cross-sectional nature of our research limits
how far we can generalise and understand the extent to which
dynamic CEO–stakeholder relationship is built over time. Also,
because CEO age, just like CEO tenure, often influences CEO hubris
and risk attitude (Zona, 2014), then there is a need to consider
another suitable measurement for the same. Krische (2011) noted that
although research using these proxies is growing, there is a need to
find alternative measures to examine the relationship. In the same
vein, the measurement or proxies can also be established through
managerial survey questionnaires as has been done on previous stud-
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